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Abstract
The claim that "skilled immigration is welcome" is often associated to
the increasing adoption of selective immigration policies. I study the vot-
ing over diﬀerentiated immigration policies in a two-country, three-factor
general equilibrium model where there exist skilled and unskilled workers,
migration decisions are endogenous, enforcing immigration restriction is
costly, and natives dislike unskilled immigration. According to my find-
ings, decisions over border closure are made to protect the median voter
when her capital endowment is suﬃciently small. Therefore I argue that
the professed favour for skilled immigration veils the protection for the in-
siders. This result is confirmed by the observation that entry is rationed
for both skilled and unskilled workers. Moreover, immigration aversion
helps to explain the existence of entry barriers for unskilled workers in
countries where the majority of voters is skilled.
Keywords : selective immigration policies, multidimensional voting,
Condorcet winner.
Jel classification : D72, F22, J18.
1 Introduction
Decisions over immigration policy are a major problem for developed countries.
Aggregate shocks -such as regional conflicts and long-term climate changes- and
persistent wage diﬀerentials foster both constrained and voluntary migration.
Representative democracies are moving towards a stricter border enforce-
ment, as reported by Boeri and Brucker (2005). In several European countries
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the importance of immigration aversion is increasing1.
A well developed literature is concerned with voting over immigration restric-
tion. Nonetheless, the study of selective policies as a result of a voting process
has received comparatively little attention. In order to shed light on this issue,
we have to drop the assumption that workers are homogeneous, and we need
to introduce skilled and unskilled labour. This fairly complicates the analysis,
because the eﬀects of immigration can be less intuitive when two factors are
entering (leaving) a country and, moreover, it implies a majority decision along
two dimensions when voting over the entry policy.
Some important attempts is in this direction are in Grether et al. (2001)
and Bilal et al. (2003). They analyse attitudes towards immigration in an
economy open to international trade. These authors use a factor-specific tech-
nology to study how immigration aﬀects the individual income for both skilled
and unskilled workers in presence of capital mobility. However, their attention
is focused on the outcome of a referendum rather than on the selection of a
Condorcet winner.
Remarkably, in the literaure the costs associated to a restrictive immigration
policy are rarely considered2. Such costs include -for example- the funding of an
Immigration Department and of frontier stations, the creation of the necessary
databases, the detection and repatriation of illegal immigrants and so on3. The
unlikely result is that voters choose corner solutions where they prefer either
open immigration or no immigration at all (see Benhabib 1996)4. In this paper
voters have to finance the border enforcement, and interior solutions appear
naturally.
Finally, decisions over immigration depend crucially on a variety of socio-
cultural factors as well. There are many non-economic reasons why natives may
dislike immigration, including concerns for preserving the national culture, the
traditional religion, or feelings of increased insecurity5. While the literature
is focused on the redistributional problem, less eﬀort has been devoted to in-
troduce immigration aversion in formal models, in spite of the overwhelming
empirical evidence of its importance. Dustmann and Preston (2004) find that
racial discrimination is by far the most important factor to explain opposition
to immigration in the U.K.; O’ Rourke and Sinnott (2006), using survey evi-
1 In recent elections, anti-immigration parties increased their votes in Denmark, Swiss,
Belgium, Norway.
2Ethier (1986) argues that "since border enforcement requires real resources, it must be
financed". Bucci and Tenorio (1996) try to estimate the welfare eﬀects of diﬀerent methods
to finance the enforcement budget. See also Hanson and Spilimbergo (2001). These papers,
however, do not consider the voting process behind the decision.
3 In Italy, the costs associated to the management of immigration flows were approximately
145 millions euro in 2004 and 206 millions euro in 2003 (Chiarotti and Martelli, 2005).
4Ortega (2005) needs intergenerational altruism without bequests to leave out corner solu-
tions for immigration policies. If bequests were allowed, intergenerational transfers would be
maximized with unlimited entry of unskilled workers.
5For example, according to a poll, in April 2007 34.6% Italians consider immigration as a
danger for the national identity. In 2005, the figure was 26.6. Similarly, the share claiming
that immigration is a danger for security and public order has increased from 39.2% (2005)
to 43.2 (april 2007). La Repubblica, 05/06/2007.
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dence for 24 countries, show that attitudes towards immigration are aﬀected by
nationalist sentiments. See also Scheve and Slaughter (2001), Mayda (2006).
Schiﬀ (2002) develops a model where immigration aﬀects individual utility via
its eﬀect on the social capital: people are assumed to derive utility from living in
a culturally homeogeneous society, with a well-defined sense of national identity.
In Hillman (2002) older people place a higher value on traditional norms than
the young. In this paper I’m also introducing immigration aversion into the
voters’ preferences. There is, indeed, a very important -and overlooked- reason
why a skilled majority should oppose open immigration for unskilled workers:
since a skilled individual can declare to be unskilled, an unconditional opening
to unskilled workers implies free entry for all workers.
The model presented in what follows obtains a selective immigration policy
as the result of a bidimensional voting process that assigns diﬀerent probability
of entry to skilled and unskilled workers. Moreover, as explained above, the
paper also takes into account both the cost of enforcing the borders and the
immigration aversion.
The results show that selective policies, instead of "welcoming" skilled im-
migration, can be interpreted as a form of protectionism, where a skilled median
voter decides the extent of the entry rationing. In other words, entry require-
ments are set high enough to protect the median voter from the competition.
On the other hand, the role of immigration aversion is useful to explain why
a skilled majority restricts the entry of a complementary factor (unskilled work).
The paper is organized as follows: after this Introduction, Sections 2 and
3 describe, respectively, the characteristics of the destination and of the origin
country. Section 4 introduces the borders enforcement costs, and in Section 5 I
present the immigration policy and the formalization of the emigration decision.
Section 6 studies the voting over selective immigration policies, and section 7
reports some examples of selective policies and some statistics on the educational
attainment in the OECD countries. Conclusions are summarized in Section 8,
and the proofs are gathered in the Appendix.
2 Destination Country
D includes a given population of skilled workers (SD) and unskilled workers
(UD). Each worker, skilled or unskilled, is endowed with a unit of labor supplied
inelastically in a competitive labor market. The production technology is
YD = F (U, S,K) (1)
where YD is a homogeneous consumption good. K, S and U stand, respectively,
for aggregate capital, skilled and unskilled labor. F (U, S,K) exhibits the usual
neoclassical features: it is CRS, smooth and strictly concave; moreover, given
K, when U = S the marginal product of skilled workers is higher than that of
unskilled workers. Partial derivatives are denoted by subscripts: FS , FU , FK are
the marginal productivities.
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For simplicity, only skilled workers are endowed with capital6 , denoted by
kj (j = 1, 2, ...SD). kj is distributed according to the continuous function n(k)
defined over
£
k, k¯
¤
, with k, k¯ > 0; k¯ can be arbitrarily high and k can be
arbitrarily small. The aggregate capital (K) is given by
K =
Z k¯
k
n (k) kdk (2)
and the total natives of D (LD) are
LD = UD + SD = UD +
Z k¯
k
n (k) dk (3)
3 Origin Country
O is also populated by skilled workers (SO) and unskilled workers (UO). For
simplicity, we suppose that O is a poor country, and that it has no capital.
Agents living in O also supply inelastically one unit of labor in a competitive
labor market. A homogeneous consumption good YO is produced out of a CRS
technology G(U,S) using only unskilled and skilled labor (U and S):
YO = G(U, S) (4)
G(U,S) has the same standard properties of F (U, S,K)7 . Again, partial deriva-
tives are denoted by subscripts: GS ,GU are the marginal productivities. Since
there is no capital, for a given vector of (U, S) the marginal productivity is lower
than in D.
An important characteristic of the literature on migrations is the assumption
that consuming at home yields a higher utility. This assumption is essential to
explain why current emigration flows are indeed low, given the existing wage
diﬀerentials. For example, Ramos (1992) shows that only 25% of Puerto Ri-
cans migrate to the US even though they are entitled to free mobility to the
U.S. According to Borjas (1999) this is a proof that "important non-economic
factors help to restrain migration flows". These restraining factors include, for
example, diﬀerences in language and culture and the psychic costs of entering
an alien environment. In the present model, the preference for domestic con-
sumption is denoted by the parameters θS , θU for skilled and unskilled workers
respectively. Workers are heterogeneous with respect to their preference for
home consumption, and the distributions of (θS , θU ) are given by the continu-
ous and diﬀerentiable functions i (θS) , i (θU ) defined, respectively, over the real
6As far as the cost of enforcing the border is borne mainly by skilled workers, this assump-
tion does not cause any loss in generality.
7 It is useful to recall that stadard production functions like (1) and (4) are analytic, i.e.
they can be developed in a convergent Taylor series in any point of their domains. This
property will be used to prove Lemma 1.
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intervals [θS , θ¯S ] and [θU , θ¯U ] 8. For any θS , θU , i (θS) and i (θU ) give, respec-
tively, the number of skilled and unskilled workers endowed with that value of
the parameter. The cumulative distributions are indicated by I (θS) and I (θU ) ,
where
I (θS) =
Z θS
θS
i (θS) dθS ; (5)
I (θU ) =
Z θU
θU
i (θU ) dθU (6)
obviously, we have dI(θS)dθS = i (θS) and
dI(θU )
dθU = i (θU ) .
The natives of O are, then9,
LO = SO + UO = I
¡
θ¯S
¢
+ I
¡
θ¯U
¢
. (7)
By using a simple linear representation, it is possible to characterize the utilities
in O and D as follows:
uS (c, θS) =
½
θScO (consumption in O)
cD (consumption in D)
(skilled workers) (8)
uU (c, θU ) =
½
θUcO (consumption in O)
cD (consumption in D)
(unskilled workers)
where cO and cD are, respectively, consumption in O and D. When deciding
whether to migrate or not, the agent compares her domestic utility to her utility
abroad. Therefore, pre-migration heterogeneity does not translate into any post-
migration heterogeneity.
4 Enforcement Cost
The immigration policy in D can be summarized by the pair
πS ∈ [0, 1] (9)
πU ∈ [0, 1]
where πS and πU are, respectively, the shares of skilled and unskilled immigrants
let in.
As explained in the Introduction, since any barrier to entry has to be ef-
fective, it requires some enforcement. It is evident, indeed, that enforcing the
8 It is assumed that θS > 1 and θU > 1 because any agent is supposed to have a higher
utility at home. In general, θS and θU might be smaller than unity, depicting agents who
prefer consuming abroad. On the other hand, θ¯S and θ¯U can be arbitrarily high.
9For simplicity I have used the same notation for both distributions i(θ) but, obviously,
this does not mean that the distributions are the same.
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border is costly, and that it requires structures as immigration departments,
monitoring systems, jails, courts.
Below, I specify the properties of the enforcement cost c(πS , πU ), defined
over πS , πU ∈ [0, 1] , and twice continuously diﬀerentiable by assumption. Par-
tial derivatives are denoted with subscripts: cπS (πS , πU ) and cπU (πS , πU ) are,
respectively, the marginal costs incurred to enforce πS and πU .
cπS (πS , πU ) < 0 and bounded for all πS ∈ [0, 1] (10)
cπU (πS , πU ) < 0 and bounded for all πU ∈ [0, 1] (11)
c(1, 1) = 0 (12)
c(0, 0) = c0 > 0 (13)
Conditions (10) and (11) mean that the cost is decreasing in πS , πU and that the
marginal cost is finite. Condition (12) says that no restriction implies no cost,
and condition (13) gives the (finite) cost of a perfect frontier closure. These
assumptions are quite general and fit a wide class of functional forms.
For simplicity, this cost is financed via a flat tax on the capital income,
therefore, labour income is not taxed10. Obviously, since unskilled workers do
not own any capital, they pay no taxes. Let wDS and wDU define, respectively,
the skilled and unskilled wage in D. The enforcement cost per unit of capital
income is given by
τK =
c(πS , πU )
KFK
where KFK is the economy’s total capital income.
The individual tax is therefore
Tj = c(πS , πU )
∙
kj
K
¸
(14)
To ensure that the net capital income is not negative for any j, I assume
that the cost of perfect enforcement (c0) satisfiesh
FK −
c0
K
i
≥ 0. (15)
this also ensures that the capital income without immigration is suﬃcient to
finance perfect border closure.
5 Immigration Policy and the Emigration Deci-
sion
It is important now to adopt two simplifying assumptions: D and O cannot
trade, and capital cannot flow from D to O. As a consequence, only migra-
tion can make factor prices to converge. These assumptions are of great help
10This is equivalent to a progressive tax on the total income with a no-tax threshold equal
to the skilled wage.
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in simplify the algebra and, though drastic, they mirror well-known stylized
facts: wage diﬀerentials are persistent, and capital does not flow towards poor
countries (Lucas 1990).
From the point of view a potential migrant, πS or πU represents the prob-
ability of a successful migration. This method depicts intuitively the eﬀect of
entry rationing. The decision whether to migrate or not for an agent living in
O is made by comparing the utilities within the alternative locations.
The model can be described in three steps: (1) natives choose a pair of
immigration policies πS , πU ∈ [0, 1] ; (2) potential migrants choose whether or
not to migrate; (3) the nature randomly chooses the shares πS , πU of successful
migrants.
Natives of O compare their utility in the two countries. Let wUD be the
skilled wage in D, and wUO the unskilled wage in O. Since we are in a single-
period model, consumption coincides with income. By using the linear utility
defined in (8), skilled workers try to migrate if wSD ≥ θUwSO, and unskilled
workers do so if wUD ≥ θSwUO. As a consequence, we have to find a pair (θˆS , θˆU )
such that any agent denoted, respectively, by θS ≤ θˆS , θU ≤ θˆU is willing to
migrate.
Therefore, we are searching for the solutions to½
wSD ≥ θSwSO
wUD ≥ θUwUO
(16)
Condition (16) can be rewritten in terms of marginal productivities (partial
derivatives of the production functions are denoted with subscripts):
⎧
⎨
⎩
FS [(SD + πSI(θS), (UD + πUI(θU ),K] ≥ θSGS [(SO − πSI(θS), (UO − πUI(θU )]
FU [(SD + πSI(θS)), (UD + πUI(θU )),K] ≥ θUGU [(SO − πSI(θS)), (UO − πUI(θU )]
(16’)
Each inequality means that emigration towards D continues until the utility
of consuming in D is larger or equal to the utility of consuming in O. For a
given policy (πS , πU ) , let θ˜S (θ˜U ) and θ˜U (θ˜S) denote the marginal skilled and
unskilled individuals who weakly prefer migrating to staying in O. Obviously,
the complementarity of production factors implies that the quantity of unskilled
workers aﬀects the wage of a skilled worker and viceversa. This is the reason of
the dependence between θ˜S and θ˜U .
Now it is necessary to introduce a mild assumption: remark that it θ˜S (θ˜U )
and θ˜U (θ˜S) are obtained by inverting the marginal productivities. Since the
latter are analytic (see Footnote 7), I assume that analiticity is preserved after
the inversion. This hypotesis is quite useful to prove the following Lemma:
Lemma 1 The system of inequalities (16’) always admits at least a solution
given by θS ≤ θˆS (πS , πU ) , θU ≤ θˆU (πS , πU ). Any pair (θˆS (πS , πU ) , θˆU (πS , πU ))
is locally unique.
Proof. See the Appendix.
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The Proposition states that it is always possible to partition the population
of O into potential migrants and stayers. In order to simplify the notation, in
what follows I’m going to omit the arguments of θˆS (πS , πU ) , θˆU (πS , πU ) where
this can be done unambigously.
The equilibrium real wages in the destination country are given by the left
hand-side of (16) evaluated at θˆS , θˆU . Remark that in equilibrium the skilled
wage cannot be lower than the unskilled wage. This happens since skilled wokers
can accept unskilled jobs but not viceversa11 .
To characterize the behaviour of θˆS , θˆU with respect to πS and πU we need a
further assumption. In fact, when two production factors are moving, the ceteris
paribus condition is violated, and complementarity makes it diﬃcult to predict
what happens to the marginal productivities in both countries. Therefore, we
need an assumption on the second derivatives of the production functions. The
proposed assumption states that, as skilled and unskilled workers enter (leave)
a country, the marginal wage eﬀect of the competing factor is higher than the
marginal wage eﬀect of the complementary factor. This ensures that immigra-
tion decreases wages in D and increases wages in O. Thus, complementarity
-though important- is not suﬃcient to oﬀset the decreasing marginal produc-
tivity. On the other hand, complementarity helps to explain why the negative
eﬀect of immigration on wages is often lower than expected12 (for recent evi-
dence on the wage eﬀects and a brief review of the existing results, see Aydemir
and Borjas, 2007).
In order to make the formulas less cumbersome, I’m going to omit the argu-
ments of the partial derivatives where this can be done unambiguously.
What has been discussed above is summarized by means of the following
assumption:
for a given
h
θˆS , θˆU
i
| FSS |>| FSU |;
| FUU |>| FUS |;
| GSS |>| GSU |;
| GUU |>| GUS | (17)
Under assumption (17) it is possible to characterize the behaviour of θˆS , θˆU
with respect to πS , πU :
Lemma 2 In equilibrium, we have
∂θˆS
∂πS
< 0; ∂θˆS
∂πU
> 0; (18)
11 If the marginal productivity of unskilled workers is higher, skilled ones will accept positions
in the unskilled sector until the two productivities converge.
12A great deal of literature is devoted to studying the eﬀect of immigration on wages. While
the magnitude of the eﬀect is debated, there is substantial agreement that wages decrease as
long as the capital endowment is constant (Aydemir and Borjas, 2007).
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and
∂θˆU
∂πU
< 0; ∂θˆU
∂πS
> 0; (19)
Proof. See the Appendix. The lemma can be easily proved by applying the
Implicit Function Theorem.
As we are going to see in the next Lemma, θˆS and θˆU are decreasing, re-
spectively, in πS and πU because more border openness increases the number of
successful migrations and thus reduces the wage diﬀerential.
Such a result is not as straightforward as it could appear: a larger πS (or
(πU )) increases the probability of migrating, but also reduces the wage diﬀeren-
tial, and therefore the incentive to migrate. Recall that the number of successful
skilled immigrants is the share πS of I(θˆS) individuals willing to migrate, there-
fore πSI(θˆS). The successful unskilled immigrants are, of course, πUI(θˆU ).
Lemma 3 The number of successful immigrants is increasing in πS , πU , i.e.
d
h
πSI(θˆS)
i
dπS
> 0 ;
d
h
πSI(θˆS)
i
dπU
> 0 (20)
d
h
πUI(θˆU )
i
dπU
> 0 ;
d
h
πUI(θˆU )
i
dπS
> 0 (21)
Proof. See the Appendix.
The previous Lemma and the complementarity of production factors allow
us to write the following Corollary:
Corollary 4 since the number of successful immigrants is increasing with πS
and πU , we have ∂FS∂πU > 0,
∂FU
∂πS > 0,
∂FK
∂πS > 0,
∂FK
∂πU > 0. Moreover, since
enforcement costs are decreasing in πS and πU ,the skilled (unskilled) wage is
always increasing with respect to πU (πS).
Remark, finally, that the individual share of enforcement cost decreases as
πS or πU increase.
6 Voting Over Immigration Policy
As I argued in the Introduction, an overwhelming literature proves that non-
economic factors matter in decisions over immigration. In spite of its impor-
tance, this point is little developed. The present model takes into account this
factor in the simplest way: it is assumed that the stock of unskilled immigrants
enters negatively the utility. Skilled immigration, on the other hand, has smaller
figures and creates less concerns (Hanson et al. 2005). Therefore, it is possible
to write the utility of natives -defined, respectively, as QS , QU - as depending on
their net income, minus the stock of immigrants.
9
QS = FS +
∙
FK −
c(πS , πU )
K
¸
kj − πUI(θˆU ) (22)
QU = FU − πUI(θˆU ) (23)
QS and QU are, respectively, the utility of a skilled and of an unskilled native.
FS is the skilled wage, and FKkj is the capital income. c(πS , πU )kjK is the tax
necessary to enforce the entry barriers, and it is paid only by skilled workers.
Obviously, FU is the unskilled wage. Only natives are granted voting rights,
and they choose the values of [πS , πU ] that maximize their utility. For the
final results it is quite important to remark that utility in (22) describes single-
crossing preferences, as it is stated in the following Lemma:
Lemma 5 The preferences described by (22) are single-crossing.
Proof. see the Appendix.
The single-crossing property will be quite useful in determining the voting
behaviour of skilled voters in the next Section.
6.1 Pairwise alternatives: the Shepsle procedure
I want now to investigate the existence of an immigration policy able to defeat
any other policy in a pairwise contest under majority voting. I’m going to adopt
the Shepsle procedure as the solution concept for this bidimensional voting
problem.
The following analysis holds around any solution of (16’). For simplicity, the
main result is stated at the outset:
Proposition 6 In a Shepsle voting procedure over (πS , πU ) , the Condorcet win-
ning immigration policy (π∗S , π∗U ) is chosen by the median voter in the case of
a skilled majority; when the majority is unskilled the policy is adopted by una-
nimity.
Proof. See the Appendix.
This result is quite intuitive, and holds under standard conditions specified
in the Appendix. For skilled workers, indeed, preferences are single-crossing
along each dimension of the problem. Unskilled workers, instead, are unanimous
because they are homogeneous. Now it is necessary to characterize the main
properties of the pair (π∗S , π∗U ) when the majority is skilled or unskilled.
6.1.1 Skilled natives: decision over skilled immigration
Even though no closed-form solutions are available, it is possible to have some
information on the voters’ decision: consider first the choice of πS . As it is
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showed in the Appendix, it is possible to see when voters prefer a corner solu-
tion or an interior solution. This depends, of course, on the individual capital
endowment. By analysing the slope of the utility in a neighborhood of πS = 0
and in a neighborhood of πS = 1, it is possible to introduce the following
Proposition13:
Proposition 7 (Optimal πS for skilled natives): given the capital endowments14
Z(0), Z(1) :
Z(0) ≡ D(0)(1− FSS)
FKSD(0) + πUFKU i(θˆU (0, πU ))∂θˆU∂πS −
cπS (0,πU )
K
Z(1) ≡
D(1)(1− FSS)− πUFSU i
³
θˆU (1, πU )
´
∂θˆU
∂πS
FKSD(1) + πUFKU i(θˆU (1, πU ))∂θˆU∂πS −
cπS (1,πU )
K
then,
(a) if Z(1) ≥ Z(0), votes are dispersed:
for any kj ≤ Z(0), we have π∗S = 0 ;
for any kj ∈ (Z(0), Z(1)], we have π∗S ∈ (0, 1);
for any kj > Z(1), we have π∗S = 1
(b) if Z(0) > Z(1), votes are polarized:
for any kj ≤ Z(1), we have π∗S = 0
for any kj > Z(0), we have π∗S = 1
Proof. See the Appendix.
This Proposition specifies when skilled voters choose interior solutions or
corner solutions with respect to the entry of the competing factor15 . As I will
argue later, case (a) describes best the policies adopted by developed countries,
13 In order to make the expression more readable, with a slight abuse of notation, in the defi-
nitions of ZS(0), ZS(1), VS(0), VS(1), the symbol of the limit is omitted. I have written always
∂θˆS
∂πS
instead of lim
πS→0
∂θˆS
∂πS
, lim
πS→1
∂θˆS
∂πS
, lim
πU→0
∂θˆS
∂πU
, lim
πU→1
∂θˆS
∂πU
. The same is true for ∂θˆU∂πU ,
∂θˆU
∂πU
and for all derivatives, indicated, for example, with FSS instead of limπS→0
FSS .
14 In the definitions of Z(0), Z(1) we have D(0) ≡ lim
πS→0
∂πU I(θˆU )
∂πS
= I(θˆS(0, πU )) > 0, and
D(1) ≡ lim
πS→1
∂πUI(θˆU )
∂πS
= I(θˆS(1, πU )) + i(θˆS(1, πU )) limπS→1
∂θˆS
∂πS
> 0.
15When Z(1)→ +∞ we never have the corner solution π∗ = 1
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where skilled immigration is neither forbidden nor open. In case (b) we can see
that the population of skilled voters is polarized between those preferring open
immigration and those preferring no immigration at all. This situation can be
interpreted as a particular case of (a). Notice that if Z(1) < 0 we have π∗S = 1
by unanimity.
6.1.2 Skilled natives: decision over unskilled immigration
By repeating the reasoning used in the previous Section, we can partition the
natives with respect to their choice over unskilled immigration. It is useful
recalling that the skilled wage is always increasing as unskilled workers enter D,
thus any possible solution π∗U < 1 is due to non-economic concerns.
Proposition 8 (optimal πU for the skilled natives): given the capital endow-
ments16 VS(0), VS(1) as follows:
V (0) ≡ E(0)(1− FSU )
FKUE(0) + πSFKSi(θˆS(πS , 0) ∂θˆS∂πU −
cπU (πS ,0)
K
;
V (1) =
E(1)(1− FSU )− πSFSSi(θˆS(πS , 1)) ∂θˆS∂πU
FKUE(1) + πSFKSi(θˆS(πS , 1)) ∂θˆS∂πU −
cπU (πS,1)
K
;
then,
(a0) if V (1) ≥ V (0) votes are dispersed:
for any kj ≤ V (0), we have π∗iU = 0;
for any kj ∈ (V (0), V (1)], we have π∗iU ∈ (0, 1);
for any kj > V (1), we have π∗iU = 1
(b0) if V (0) > V (1) votes are polarized:
for any kj ≤ V (0) we have π∗iU = 0
for any kj > V (0) we have π∗iU = 1
The above Proposition, as the previous one, specifies the intervals of cap-
ital endowments that produce, respectively, interior solutions and corner solu-
16 In the definitions of VS(0), VS(1) we have E(0) ≡ limπU→0
∂πU I(θˆU )
∂πU
= I(θˆU (πS , 0)) > 0,
and E(1) ≡ lim
πU→1
∂πU I(θˆU )
∂πU
= I(θˆU (πS , 1)) + i(θˆU (πS , 1)) limπU→1
∂θˆU
∂πU
> 0.
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tions17. In particular, when at least one of V (0), V (1) is negative, the max-
ima always lie at a corner. The Condorcet winner depends on where the me-
dian voter’s capital endowment lies. Depending on the relative magnitudes of
V (0), V (1), Z(0), Z(1), it is possible to obtain any combination of interior and
corner solutions for skilled and unskilled immigration. To understand the prac-
tical implications, the next Section reviews the selective policies’ requirements
and shows that entry is restricted for both skilled and unskilled immigrants.
Therefore, we can conclude that the observed policies correspond to an interior
solution along both dimensions, i.e. (π∗S , π∗U ∈ (0, 1)). This result is summarized
by case (a) in Proposition 7 and by case (a’) in Proposition 8.
6.1.3 Unskilled natives
The solution for the unskilled workers problem is easier than the one for skilled
workers, and it is summarized in the following Proposition:
Proposition 9 (Optimal choice for the unskilled natives): since they are ho-
mogeneous, unskilled nativess decide by unanimity. The utility maximizing pair
is π∗U = 0, π∗S = 1.
Proof. See the Appendix.
This result is quite intuitive, because unskilled workers can switch the cost
of border enforcement towards skilled workers, thus they can enjoy protection
at no cost. Once the competing factor is left out, labour income is maximized
with open entry for the complementary factor.
However, in destination countries unskilled voters are likely to be a minority,
and the final decision to pertain to skilled natives.
7 Current immigration policies
In what follows, the attention is focused on the main requirements to enter the
most important destination countries where selective policies are applied. It is
evident that access to skilled workers is far from being open.
For example, Canada requires an Employment Authorization (i.e. a job
oﬀer), which entitles to a temporary residence permit. The EA is not required
for certain activities considered "beneficial to Canada", which include some
highly-skilled jobs and business operators. More requirements have to be met
to get a permanent residence permit: job-searching immigrants are screened
according to a point system, and business immigrants are selected upon their
abilities "to make a contribution to the Canada’s economy". The score to get
an immigrant visa is 67 points.
Entry to Australia is heavily regulated: applicants take a point test for many
visa classes. The main requirements to get a skilled immigration visa are: being
under 45, being fluent in English, matching the Australian Skilled Occupation
17When VS(1)→ +∞ we never have the corner solution π∗U = 1
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List, having more than a post-secondary education, and having the Australian
Assessing Authorithy approve the application.
Another remarkable example is the US "green card" lottery program, which
grants a permanent residence permit to 55000 skilled immigrants randomly cho-
sen from the pool of applicants. Regulations for entering the US are quite com-
plicated: diﬀerent visas are granted on the basis of individual characteristics18 .
A comprehensive survey of the European immigration policies falls outside
the scope of this paper. Therefore, I’m going to review only some of the most
evident entry restrictions for skilled workers. In the UK, the Highly Skilled Mi-
grant Programme is a point system used to select the most qualified immigrants.
The admission threshold has been recently increased from 65 to 75 points19, in-
dicating and increasing protectionism. Since 2002, a Sectors Based Scheme and
a Seasonal Agricultural Workers Scheme are used for unskilled workers: they
must be between 18 and 30 and have a job oﬀer from a list of sectors where the
local labour supply is scarce. Moreover, immigrants can bring no dependents
into the country. The reform of immigration regulation to be adopted in 2008
provides for a new points system that replaces the mentioned programs with a
5-tier system. The UK Home Secretary recently declared that the new points
system will provide for "clear criteria set for who we need to come here and who
we don’t"20.
Since 2000, Germany is implementing special programs ("green cards") for
highly-skilled immigrants in the IT sector. Currently, a new immigration law is
under discussion at the Bundestag. It should include a point system granting
permanent residence even without a job oﬀer and the mandatory attendance to
German courses.
Of course, admission thresholds can be changed according to economic and
political needs (they have recently been lowered in Canada and increased in the
UK).
Such selection acts as rationing mechanism, rather than as a "welcome" for
skilled workers. The reluctance in opening the labour market to citizens of Cen-
tral and Eastern European (CEE) entrants to EU on may 1st, 2004, is another
example of skilled immigration rationing. These countries provide for a large
supply of well-educated workers, whose access is regulated by some transitional
arrangements. Currently, under the second phase of such arrangements, dif-
ferent kinds of restrictions for Eastern European workers still hold in Belgium,
France, Denmark, Austria, Germany and the U.K. Eﬀective freedom of move-
ment should start only in 2011. Chart 1 on the next page -taken from OECD
(2007)- reports some education indicators for the OECD countries.
18Entry to the U.S. is regulated via a complicated system of visas depending on the skills of
the applicants and their sector of activity. They are issued in a pre-determined amount each
year.
19Points are scored in the following five main areas: educational qualifications, work ex-
perience, past earnings, achievements in the applicant’s chosen profession, and the skills and
achievements of the applicant’s partner.
20 Speech at the LSE Migration Studies Unit, 12-5-2007.
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Chart 1. Population that has attained at least upper secondary education1 (2005)
Percentage, by age group
25-to-34-year-olds 45-to-54-year-olds
1. Excluding ISCED 3C short programmes.
2. Year of reference 2003.
3. Including some ISCED 3C short programmes.
4.Year of reference 2004.
Countries are ranked in descending order of the percentage of 25-to-34-year-olds who have attained at least upper secondary
education.
Source: OECD. Table A1.2a. See Annex 3 for notes (www.oecd.org/edu/eag2007).
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From Chart 1 we see that educational attainments21 for upper secondary
education in CEE countries are above average -with the exception of Poland-
. Considered that even in Western Europe only a minority of the population
accomplished tertiary education, (see OECD 2007, page 29) we can expect that
national median voters are educated at the upper secondary level. Therefore
Eastern European workers are likely to compete with them22.
From this point of view, It is not diﬃcult to explain "why European are so
tough on Eastern-European migrants" (Boeri and Brucker, 2005). Indeed, the
interpretation proposed in this paper complements the explanation of Boeri and
Brucker (2005), who argue that the tightening of immigration restriction can be
due to a lack of co-ordination among EU members.
8 Conclusions
In this paper I developed a model of voting over selective immigration policies
within a three-factor, two-country model. I paid particular attention to include
skilled and unskilled voters, and to consider the aversion to immigration, whose
importance is neglected in the literature in spite of its overwhelming empirical
evidence. This aversion has been useful to explain why entry for unskilled
workers is restricted in skilled, well educated societies. From this point of view,
entry rationing for unskilled immigrants is more diﬃcult to explain than entry
rationing for skilled ones. Moreover, the role played by the cost of financing
immigration restrictions is crucial to understand why it is so diﬃcult to observe
a perfect border closure, and why a positive inflow of immigrants is always
allowed.
Unlike the generalized claim that qualified immigration is "welcome", my
model obtains a selective immigration policy as a form of protectionism. Indeed,
freedom of entry is usually granted to highly skilled individuals in specific sectors
of the economy where they do not compete with the median voter.
As mentioned above, the German Green Card scheme introduced in August
2000 was aimed at recruiting IT specialists to respond to a predicted national
shortage. The UK Highly Skilled Migrant Programme started in 2002 opened
the door to highly skilled individuals who had the skills and experience required
by the UK.
Such limited inflows appear carefully designed in order to protect the na-
tional median voters. In the model presented, the case of a skilled majority with
interior solutions yields a satisfactory representation of the selective immigration
policies.
21The OECD data are based on the 1997 Unesco International Standard Classification of
Education. ISCED 3C indicates programmes of upper secondary eduction at least one year
shorter than the norm.
22The upper secondary education attainment rates for the Baltic countries are between
60-70% (OECD 2003).
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1
Existence:
I report here the system of inequalities in (16’):
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
FS [(SD + πSI(θS)), (UD + πUI(θU )),K)] ≥ θSGS [(SO − πSI(θS)), (UO − πUI(θU ))]
(γ) -skilled
FU [(SD + πSI(θS)), (UD + πUI(θU ))] ,K ≥ θUGU [(SO − πSI(θS)), (UO − πUI(θU )) ]
(σ) -unskilled
By assumption, the marginal productivities are continuous and diﬀerentiable
in all their arguments. The LHS of each inequality is the utility of consuming
abroad, while the RHS is the utility of consuming at home. Suppose there is a
solution θ˜U to ineq. (σ), and consider ineq. (γ). For having an interior solution,
we want that, for any θ˜U , there exist θ˜S(θ˜U ) such that the LHS of (γ) equals
the RHS. If an interior solution does not exist, either FS < θSGS for any θS
or viceversa. In the first case, there is no incentive to migrate for all (skilled)
agents. This case has no economic interest, and we can rule it out without loss
of generality. On the other hand, when θSGS < FS for any θS , there exist an
incetive to migrate for all (skilled) workers. Hence, the problem is reduced to
analyse only the solutions to eq. (σ) . Apart this trivial case, since ∂FS∂θS < 0 and
∂GS
∂θS > 0, continuity is suﬃcient to get a unique solution θ˜S(θ˜U )
23 .
The same argument can be used to prove that, in eq. (σ) , there exist θ˜U (θ˜S)
for any θ˜S (apart the trivial case). In the following table, I report the set of
possible solutions to (16’):
Corner Solution
FU > θUGU
Interior Solution
FU = θUGU
Corner Solution
FS > θSGS
θˆU = θ¯U∀θ˜S
θˆS = θ¯S∀θ˜U
θˆU ∈
¡
θU , θ¯U
¢
θˆS = θ¯S∀θ˜U
Interior Solution
FS = θSGS
θˆU = θ¯U∀θ˜S
θˆS ∈
¡
θS , θ¯S
¢ θˆU ∈ ¡θU , θ¯U¢
θˆS ∈
¡
θS , θ¯S
¢
Now, I have to prove that, given θ˜S(θ˜U ) and θ˜U (θ˜S), it is possible to find θˆU
and θˆS such that θ˜U (θˆS) = θˆU , and θ˜S(θˆU ) = θˆS .
23Remark that θ˜S(θ˜U ) is obtained by inverting (FS − θSGS = 0) that is a continuous, bi-
jective function. As a consequence, θ˜S(θ˜U ) is continuous as well.
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This is true when the function Φ(θ˜U ) = θ˜U (θ˜S(θ˜U )) has a fixed point. Since
the sets [θS , θ¯S ], [θU , θ¯U ] are convex and compact, and since Φ(θ˜U ) maps [θU , θ¯U ]
continuously into itself, existence is proved by the Brouwer’s fixed point theorem.
Local Uniqueness
In order for the solution (θˆU , θˆS) to be locally unique, we need that it does
not exist an interval where the functions θ˜S(θ˜U ) and θ˜U (θ˜S) are overlapped.
Since both θ˜S(θ˜U ) and θ˜U (θ˜S) are analytic by assumption, this holds for any
θ˜S(θ˜U ) 6= θ˜U (θ˜S).
Proof of Lemma 2
Lemma 2 can easily be proved by applying the Implicit Function Theorem
and assumption (17) to the equations in (16’). In order to obtain simpler ex-
pressions, I’m going to define the following terms:
C(U) ≡ πU i(θˆU )(FUU + θˆUGUU )−GU < 0 (24)
C(S) ≡ πSi(θˆS)(FSS + θˆSGSS)−GS < 0 (25)
A ≡ πU i(θˆU )(FUU + θˆUGUU )(FSS + θˆSGSS)−
−πU i(θˆU )(FSU + θˆUGSU )(FUS + θˆUGUS)−GU (FSS + θˆSGSS) > 0; (26)
B ≡ πSi(θˆS)(FSS + θˆSGSS)(FUU + θˆUGUU )−
−πSi(θˆS)(FSU + θˆSGSU )(FUS + θˆUGUS)−GS(FUU + θˆUGUU ) > 0 (27)
The derivatives in (18) are, respectively,
dθˆS
dπS
=
−AI(θˆS)
πSi(θˆS)A−GSC(U)
< 0 (28)
and
dθˆS
dπU
=
GU (FSU + θˆSGSU )I(θˆU )
πU i(θˆU )B − C(S)GU
> 0; (29)
the derivatives in (19) are, respectively,
dθˆU
dπU
=
−BI(θˆU )
πU i(θˆU )B −GUC(S)
< 0 (30)
and
dθˆU
dπS
=
GS(FUS + θˆUGUS)I(θˆS)
πSi(θˆS)A− C(U)GS
> 0. (31)
Proof of Lemma 3
The number of successful immigrants is increasing with respect to the border
openness: for skilled workers we have
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d(πSI(θˆS))
dπS
=
−GSC(U)I(θˆS)
AπSi(θˆS)−GSC(U)
> 0 (32)
d(πSI(θˆS)
dπU
= πSi(θˆS)
dθˆS
dπU
> 0 (33)
and for the unskilled
d(πUI(θˆU ))
dπS
= πU i(θˆU )
dθˆS
dπU
> 0 (34)
d(πUI(θˆU ))
dπU
=
−GUC(S)I(θˆU )
BπU i(θˆU )−GUC(S)
> 0. (35)
Proof of Lemma 5
It is necessary to check if the preferences of skilled workers are single-crossing
along both dimensions of the problem (πS , πU ). That can be done by applying
the definition and recalling assumption (17): preferences exhibit the single-
crossing property with respect to πS if we can order the voters from left to right
with respect to their capital endowment and, given π0S > πS and k0 > k, we
have:
if u (k0, πS) ≥ u (k0, π0S) (α) then u (k1, πS) ≥ u (k1, π0S) (α0)
and
if u (k, π0S) ≥ u (k, πS) (β) then u (k0, π0S) ≥ u (k0, πS) (β0)
when (α) is true we can write (omitting for simplicity the arguments of FS)
FS [πS ]− FS [π0S ] + πUI(θˆU (π0S , πU ))− πUI(θˆU (πS , πU )) ≥
≥ k0
∙
c(πS , πU )
K
− c(π
0
S , πU )
K
+ FK [π0S ]− FK [πS ]
¸
(36)
when (α) holds, it clearly implies (α0) because k < k0. Condition (β) can be
written as
FS [πS ]− FS [π0S ] + πUI(θˆU (π0S , πU ))− πUI(θˆU (πS , πU )) ≤
k0
∙
c(πS , πU )
K
− c(π
0
S , πU )
K
+ FK [π0S ]− FK [πS ]
¸
(37)
and it clearly implies (β’) since k < k0.
Proof of Proposition 6
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In order to apply the Shepsle procedure, each voter finds the value of πS that
maximizes her utility for a given πU and viceversa. This produces two "reaction
functions" π∗S(πU ) and π∗U (πS). These functions clearly exist because (22) and
(23) are continuous functions defined over a compact domain, and we can apply
the Weierstrass theorem. π∗S(πU ) and π∗U (πS) are implicit functions. Consider
now the function Ω = π∗S(πU ) − π∗U (πS). If it displays a fixed point, then an
equilibrium exists. Since Ω is continuous, in order to apply the Brouwer’s fixed
point theorem we only need that the absolute maxima π∗S(πU ) and π∗U (πS) are
unique; otherwise the domain of Ω would not be convex. Thus, as usual in the
literature, the existence result is restricted to the case in which π∗S(πU ) and
π∗U (πS) are unique.
Proof of Proposition 7
Consider the derivative of (22) with respect to πS :
∂QS
∂πS
= FSS
Ã
I(θˆS) + πSi(θˆS)
∂θˆS
∂πS
!
+ πUFSU i(θˆU )
∂θˆU
∂πS
+ (38)
+ kj
"
FKS
Ã
I(θˆS) + πSi(θˆS)
∂θˆS
∂πS
!
+ πUFKU i(θˆU )
∂θˆU
∂πS
− cπS (πS , πU )
K
#
− πU i(θˆU )
∂θˆU
∂πS
To find the intervals Z(0), Z(1) it is necessary to find the capital endowments
such that the derivative (38) is increasing when πS → 0 and decreasing when
πS → 1 . For Z(0) it is suﬃcient computing limπS→0
∂QS
∂πS , then setting limπS→0
∂QS
∂πS >
0 and solving for kJ . For Z(1), I compute limπS→1
∂QS
∂πS , I set limπS→0
∂QS
∂πS < 0 and I
solve again for kJ . It is useful to remark that the limit of expression (38) is
finite in both cases.
Interestingly, by examining (38), we immediately see that for kj →∞ ex-
pression (38) is strictly positive for any πS . As a consequence, for kj suﬃciently
high the optimal choice will be π∗S = 1. We know that some individuals choose
such a solution since k¯ is arbitrarily high.
Proof of Proposition 8:
Consider now the derivative of (22) with respect to πU :
∂QS
∂πU
= πSFSSi(θˆS)
∂θˆS
∂πU
+ FSU
Ã
I(θˆU ) + πU i(θˆU )
∂θˆU
∂πU
!
−
Ã
I(θˆU ) + πU i(θˆU )
∂θˆU
∂πU
!
+
+ ki
Ã
πSFKSi(θˆS)
∂θˆS
∂πU
+ FKU
Ã
I(θˆU + πU i(θˆU )
∂θˆU
∂πU
!
− cπS (πS , πU )
K
!
(39)
By taking the limit of (39) for πU → 0 and πU → 1 it is possible to find V (0)
and V (1) as it has been done for Z(0), Z(1). It is important to remark that Z(1)
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and V (1) can be negative. In such a case, the utility is never decreasing as πS
and πU approach unity, and we have polarization on corner solutions.
Proof of Proposition 9
Consider the utility defined by (23). In order to apply the Shepsle procedure,
we have to find πS that maximizes the utility for a given πU . Again, let this
value be π∗S(πU ). By the Weierstrass theorem, we know that π∗S(πU ) exists.
Since there is no heterogeneity, it is chosen by unanimity. Consider now the
derivative of (23) with respect to πU : we have
∂QU
∂πU
= πSFSSi(θˆS)
∂θˆS
∂πU
+
Ã
I(θˆU ) + πU i(θˆU )
∂θˆU
πU
!
(FUU − 1) < 0 (40)
this derivative is always negative, thus, when voting over unskilled immigration,
π∗U (πS) = 0 (again by unanimity). Therefore, to get an equilibrium of the
Shepsle procedure is easier than for Prop. 6, and it is reduced to the pair
[π∗S(0), 0]. Since π∗S(0) = 1, the result is [π∗S = 1, π∗U = 0] .
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